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PREDISPUTE AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE CLAIMS
ARISING UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)l regulates trading on the United
States contract markets. 2 Section 5a(l l) 3 of the CEA provides that each
contract market shall provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbi-
1. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). The current Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA) is the result of a long history of amendments. See I P. JoHNsoN, COMMODITIES
REGULATION xxv (1982) (discussing development of CEA); Stassen, The Commodity Exchange
Act in Perspective, 39 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 825, 825-43 (1982) (review of history of futures
trading legislation in United States). In 1982 Congress enacted the most recent amendments to
the CEA by passing the Futures Trading Act of 1982. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§
1-26 (1982)); Connolly, A Review of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, 6 CORP. L. REv. 342,
342-59 (analysis of Futures Trading Act of 1982).
2. See H. FRmDmAN, SEcuarris AND COMMODITMs ENFORCEMENT 159-72 (1981) (discus-
sion of regulation and enforcement under CEA). The CEA defines commodities broadly. See 7
U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (defining commodities as 28 enumerated agricultural products and all other
goods, articles, services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently
or in future dealt in, except onions). Commodities trading consists of contracts to buy or sell
commodities at a future date. See 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at § 1.03 (1982). Contracts to
buy or sell commodities at a future date are futures contracts. Id. A board of trade is any
exchange or association, whether incorporated or unincorporated, of persons who are engaged
in the business of buying or selling commodities or receiving commodities for sale on consign-
ment. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). A board of trade that complies with and carries out the conditions
and requirements of § 5 of the CEA may be designated a contract market by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). The CEA restricts all trading in futures
contracts to the contract markets. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982). The vast majority of futures contracts
do not result in the actual delivery of the commodity but are extinguished through an offsetting
transaction. See P. JoHNsoN, supra note 1, at § 1.04 (discussion of offset transactions). An
offset transaction occurs when a party to a futures contract subsequently enters the futures
market to obtain the same type of contract but with the opposite obligation of his first contract.
Id. For example, a party whose first contract obligates that party to sell wheat for September
delivery will acquire a second contract to buy wheat for September delivery, thereby offsetting
the first contract. Id. A market price fluctuation between the two transactions would either
require the offsetting party to pay the price difference or entitle the offsetting party to receive
money, depending upon the nature of the first contract and the direction in which the market
price moved. Id.
3. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1982). In 1974 Congress amended the CEA by passing the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)). Section 209 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
added § 5a(1 1) to the CEA requiring contract markets to provide a fair, equitable and voluntary
procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement of customer claims of less than
$15,000 against any contract market member or contract market member employee. Pub. L.
No. 93-463, § 209, 88 Stat. 1389, 1401 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(1l)). Congress enacted
§ 209 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 to encourage the informal
resolution of contract market customer complaints. H. R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1974). In 1982, Congress enacted § 217 of the Futures Trading Act of 1982 which
eliminated the $15,000 ceiling on arbitrable claims. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L.
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tration or otherwise for the settlement of customer claims against any contract
market member or employee of any contract market member.4 Section 5a(l 1)
further provides that a customer's use of the fair and equitable procedure
for the settlement of the customer's claim must be voluntary.' Additionally,
section 17(b)(1O) 6 of the CEA requires registered futures associations7 to
provide the same procedure as defined in section 5a(l 1) for the settlement
of customer claims against any futures association member or employees of
any futures association member.' Sections 5a(1 1) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA
No. 97-444, § 217, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983). Congress enacted § 217 of the Futures Trading Act of
1982 to promote further the use of arbitration for the resolution of CEA disputes. See H. R.
PEP. No. 565, Part 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1982) (purpose of amendments to §§ 5a(11) and
17(b)(10) of CEA is to enhance attractiveness of arbitration as out-of-court forum for resolution
of customer-contract market member disputes), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws. 3871, 3905; 46 Fed. Reg. 60,834 (1981) (stated purpose of amendments to §§ 5a(l1) and
17(b)(10) of CEA is to encourage customer use of arbitration).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l 1) (1982). Section 5a(l 1) of the CEA provides that the term "customer"
as used in § 5a(ll) shall not include another member of the contract market. Id. Section 101
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 created the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) which replaced the Commodity Exchange Authority. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 4a (1982) (establishing CFTC). In 1976 the CFTC, under § 5a(l1) of the CEA, adopted
regulations that established standards of fairness, equitableness and voluntariness which the
required arbitration procedures of the contract markets had to satisfy. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l 1)
(1982) (contract markets must provide fair, equitable and voluntary procedure through arbitra-
tion or otherwise for settlement of customer claims); 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-180.5 (1984) (CFTC
regulations concerning arbitration and other dispute resolution procedures); infra notes 63-67
and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulation § 180.2 which establishes standards for fair
and equitable arbitration procedures).
5. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1982); see infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing
CFTC regulation § 180.3 which establishes standards for voluntary arbitration procedures).
6. 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (1982). Section 17(b)(10) of the CEA provides that the term
"customer" as used in § 17(b)(10) shall not include a futures commission merchant or a floor
broker. Id. The CFTC regulations that establish the standards of fairness, equitableness and
voluntariness of arbitration procedures also apply to registered futures association procedures.
17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-180.5 (1984); see infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC
regulations §§ 180.2 and 180.3 which contain standards for fair, equitable and voluntary
arbitration procedures).
7. See I P. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at §§ 1.89-1.92 (1982) (discussion of registered futures
associations). In response to the growing number of commodity firms electing not to belong to
contract markets because of increased membership costs and the elimination of minimum
commission rates for contract market members, Congress enacted in 1974 a new § 17 to the
CEA. See id.; 7 U.S.C. § 21 (1982) (authorizing registered futures associations). Section 17 of
the CEA encourages commodities firms to join a futures association to avoid the additional
fees, charges and regulatory requirements that § 17 of the CEA authorizes the CFTC to impose
on nonjoiners. 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at § 1.89; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 21(d), (e) (1982)
(authorizing CFTC to levy additional fees and charges and to impose additional regulatory
requirements and obligations on nonmembers of registered futures associations). Through the
creation of registered futures associations Congress alleviated the growing burden on the CFTC
of regulating independent commodity firms and merchants by assigning a self-regulatory role
to futures associations under close CFTC oversight. See 1 P. JoHNsoN, supra note 1, at § 1.89
(discussing registered futures associations); 7 U.S.C. § 21 (1982) (terms and conditions imposed
on registered futures associations).
8. 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (1982).
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represent express statements of congressional intent to encourage arbitration
as a means of settling disputes between customers and members of commodity
markets and registered futures associations. 9
The United States Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) 0 governs arbitration
agreements contained in contracts between customers and commodity market
members or futures association members, and in all other contracts involving
interstate commerce." Section 212 of the Arbitration Act provides that an
arbitration agreement in a contract involving interstate commerce shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except when grounds exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. 3 In Wilko v. Swan,' 4 the United
States Supreme Court, notwithstanding section 2 of the Arbitration Act,
invalidated a predispute agreement to arbitrate federal securities law claims
by holding that the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act),' 5 and the policy behind
its enactment, constituted grounds for invalidating the predispute arbitration
agreement.' 6 The Supreme Court, however, has not yet addressed whether
the Wilko doctrine is applicable on analogous grounds to predispute agree-
ments to arbitrate claims arising under the CEA. '
7
In Wilko, a customer of a securities brokerage firm brought an action
against the firm under section 12(2) of the '33 Act.' 8 The customer's
9. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(ll), 21(b)(10) (1982) (contract markets and registered futures
associations must provide fair, equitable and voluntary procedure through arbitration or
otherwise for settlement of customers' claims against any contract market or futures association,
member or employee); supra note 3 (discussing legislative history of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974 and Futures Trading Act of 1982). Legislative history addressing the
arbitration of disputes arising under the CEA is scarce.
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982). Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act
(Arbitration Act) to promote arbitration as an alternative to the expense and delay of litigation.
S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924); H. R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2
(1924). The Arbitration Act overruled the common law rule that an agreement between parties
to settle any dispute between them by arbitration is against public policy and void as an attempt
to oust the courts of jurisdiction over the dispute. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 501 F.2d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1974).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
12. Id.
13. Id.; see World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362. 364 (2d Cir.
1965) (word "revocation" in § 2 of Arbitration Act making arbitration agreements valid and
enforceable, except upon legal and equitable grounds for revocation of any contract, applies to
cases in which courts will rescind arbitration agreement for reasons such as fraud, duress, or
undue influence).
14. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
16. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; see supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text (discussion of
Wilko); infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text (discussion of Wilko doctrine application to
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
17. See infra notes 78-132 and accompanying text (discussing federal court of appeals and
federal district court decisions addressing whether Wilko doctrine applies to predispute agree-
ments to arbitrate claims arising under CEA).
18. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) provides
that any person who offers or sells a security in interstate commerce by means of a prospectus
1985]
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complaint in Wilko alleged that the firm induced the customer to sell his
stock at a loss through misrepresentations and omissions of material infor-
mation regarding the stock. 9 The margin agreement between the customer
and the firm contained a clause which provided that any controversy arising
between the two parties would be resolved through arbitration pursuant to
the arbitration laws of the state of New York. 20 Upon receipt of the complaint
from the customer, the brokerage firm moved to stay the trial pursuant to
section 321 of the Arbitration Act until an arbitration of the dispute took
place in accordance with the margin agreement. 22 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the brokerage firm's
motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration on the grounds that the
predispute arbitration agreement deprived the customer of the judicial re-
memdy that section 12(2) of the '33 Act provided. 23 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that the '33 Act
did not prohibit the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 24 Wilko
presented the United States Supreme Court with the question of whether the
'33 Act invalidated an otherwise valid agreement between a brokerage firm
and its customer to arbitrate future controversies arising between them. 25
or oral agreement that misstates or omits any material facts, and who fails to carry the burden
of proof of his lack of knowledge thereof, shall be liable to the person purchasing the security
from him. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1982).
19. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. The customer's complaint in Wilko specifically alleged
that the brokerage firm induced the customer to purchase 1600 shares of the common stock of
Air Associates, Inc., by misrepresentations that a merger contract with the Borg Warner Corp.
would increase the value of Air Associates common stock 6 dollars per share. Id. The customer's
complaint further alleged that the brokerage firm misrepresented that financial interests were
buying up Air Associates common stock for the speculative profit. Id. at 429. The customer's
complaint in Wilko also alleged that the brokerage firm failed to inform the customer that an
Air Associates director was then selling his own Air Associates stock, including some or all of
the stock that the customer purchased. Id. The customer in Wilko sold his Air Associates stock
at a loss two weeks after he purchased the stock from the brokerage firm. Id.
20. Id. at 432 n.15. The arbitration agreement in Wilko provided that any arbitration
between the parties would be subject to the rules of either the Arbitration Committee of the
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, or the American Arbitration Association, or
the Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Exchange or any other Exchange having
jurisdiction over the controversy, at the election of the customer. Id.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that if any suit is
brought in federal court upon an issue referable to arbitration under a written agreement, the
court shall, on the motion of one of the parties, stay the trial of the action until arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreements. Id.; see supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing purpose of Arbitration Act).
22. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing
arbitration agreement in Wilko).
23. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Section 12(2) of the '33 Act
provides that a defrauded purchaser of stock may sue the seller of that stock at law or in
equity. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); see supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing § 12(2)
of '33 Act).
24. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
25. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
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On the basis of sections 12(2), 14, and 22(a) of the '33 Act26 and the
policy underlying the enactment of the '33 Act, the Wilko Court held that
the '33 Act invalidates predispute arbitration agreements between a brokerage
firm and its customer. 27 The Court noted that Congress enacted the '33 Act
to protect investors by requiring issuers, underwriters, and dealers of secu-
rities to make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in
interstate commerce and to prevent fraud in the sale of securities in interstate
commerce. 28 The Court stated that to effectuate the congressional intent to
protect investors, section 12(2) of the '33 Act provides investors with a
special right to recover for misrepresentations and omissions made in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security in interstate commerce without
having to bear the burden of proving scienter29 on the part of the seller.
30
The Wilko Court noted that section 22(a)3 of the '33 Act provided section
12(2)'s right to recover for misrepresentation with several advantages includ-
ing the right to bring suit in federal district court where the claimant has
nationwide service of process, a wide choice of venue and no jurisdictional
amount requirements.3 2 The Supreme Court further stated that section 1433
of the '33 Act guarantees the rights of investors under the '33 Act by
providing that any stipulation binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of the '33 Act is void.34 The Court
ruled that section 14 of the '33 Act invalidated the arbitration agreement
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77n & 77v(a) (1982); see supra note 18 and accompanying text
(discussing § 12(2) of '33 Act); infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing § 14 of '33
Act); infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing § 22(a) of '33 Act).
27. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-38.
28. Id. at 431 (citing S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, (1933)).
29. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959). In Woodward v.
Wright, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit discussed the difference
between an action for fraud under § 12(2) of the '33 Act and a common-law action for fraud.
Id. The Woodward court noted that in a common-law action for fraud, the buyer must prove
that the seller knew that the fraudulent statements were false or that the seller could have
known in the exercise of reasonable care. Id. The Tenth Circuit in Woodward then stated that
a § 12(2) action differs from a common-law action for fraud in that once a buyer proves falsity,
materiality and excusable ignorance, the buyer is entitled to recover unless the seller proves that
the seller did not know that the statements were false or could not have known in the exercises
of reasonable care. Id.
30. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing § 12(2)
of '33 Act).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). Section 22(a) of the '33 Act concerns the jurisdiction of
offenses and suits under the '33 Act. Id. Section 22(a) specifically provides that United States
district courts have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under the '33 Act, and, concurrent
with state courts, of all suits in equity and at law to enforce any liability or duty that the '33
Act creates. Id.
32. Id.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Section 14 of the '33 act provides that any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of the '33 Act is void. Id.
34. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434, 435.
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contained in the margin agreement between the customer and brokerage
firm.3" The Wilko Court reasoned that the arbitration agreement constituted
a stipulation under section 14 that waived compliance with the provisions of
section 22(a) which provide a security buyer with the right to select a judicial
forum. 6 In essence, the Wilko Court held that the arbitration agreement
directly violated section 14, the anti-waiver provision of the '33 Act, by
waiving the customer's right to a judicial remedy under the '33 Act.
3 7
In holding that sections 22(a) and 14 of the '33 Act invalidated the
arbitration agreement between the customer and brokerage firm, the Wilko
Court rejected the brokerage firm's contention that the Arbitration Act,
which encourages the arbitration of disputes, did not conflict with section
22(a) of the '33 Act.18 The firm argued that arbitration is merely another
form of trial and that arbitration does not relieve the security seller of
liability or burden of proof.3 9 The Supreme Court stated that when a security
buyer waives his right to sue in court by signing a predispute arbitration
agreement, the security buyer gives up more than he would in an ordinary
business transaction and the buyer does so at a time when he is less able to
realize the disadvantages the '33 Act places on the seller. 40 The Wilko Court,
therefore, ruled that the '33 Act's purpose of protecting investors, as
evidenced by the special right to recover for misrepresentation that section
22(a) affords investors and the anti-waiver provision of section 14, out-
weighed the Arbitration Act's purpose of promoting dispute resolution
through arbitration.
4'
The courts have extended the Wilko doctrine of invalidating predispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the '33 Act on analogous policy
and statutory grounds to claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act).42 For example, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
35. Id. at 437; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing arbitration agreement
in Wilko).
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434, 435; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing
§§ 14 and 22(a) of '33 Act).
37. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434, 435.
38. Id. at 433.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court in Wilko stated that even though the provisions of
the '33 Act would apply in arbitration, the effectiveness of the '33 Act provisions in arbitration,
relative to judicial proceedings, would be lessened. Id. The Court reasoned that a claim under
§ 12(2) of the '33 Act required legal conclusions as to the issues of burden of proof, reasonable
care, and material fact, and that a judge was better equipped than an arbitrator to make such
legal conclusions. Id. at 436. The Court noted that the Arbitration Act contains no provision
for judicial determination of legal issues. Id.
41. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-38.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982); see, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598
F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979) (Wilko doctrine applies to claims arising under '34 Act); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1978) (Wilko
doctrine applicable to '34 Act claims); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (Wilko doctrine applies to SEC rule lOb-5 claims absent
presence of international concerns). But cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 447 U.S. 506, 519,
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Inc., v. Moore,4 3 a customer brought an action against his broker alleging
that the broker defrauded the customer in the handling of the customer's
investments in violation of section 17(a)44 of the '33 Act, section 10(b)41 of
the '34 Act, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5.46
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the arbitration agreement contained in the parties' investment contracts.
4 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held
the arbitration agreement void with respect to all three of the customer's
claims.41
In examining the fact situation in Moore, the Tenth Circuit first held
that the Wilko doctrine, which invalidates predispute agreements to arbitrate
claims arising under the '33 Act, applied fully to the customer's claim under
the '33 Act on the grounds that no difference existed between the section
12(2) remedy in Wilko and the section 12(2) remedy in Moore.49 The Tenth
Circuit then addressed whether the Wilko doctrine applied to the customer's
claims arising under the '34 Act.5 0 The Moore court stated that the policy of
investor protection underlying the enactment of the '33 Act does not differ
from the policy underlying the enactment of the '34 Act. The Tenth Circuit
also noted that rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the '34
520 (1974) (agreement to arbitrate dispute arising out of international commercial transaction
enforceable even though claim arose under '34 Act). See generally, Greenbaum, Avoiding the
Protections of the Federal Securities Laws: The Anti-waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 49, 49-73 (1980) (discussing Wilko doctrine applicability of '33 act and '34 Act, and Scherk
exception to Wilko doctrine).
43. 590 F.2d 823, 825 (10th Cir. 1978).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). Section 17(a) of the '33 Act proscribes the sale or purchase
or any security through fraud or through the use of materially false or misleading statements
or omissions. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) of the '34 Act prohibits any person, through
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, from using or employing, in
connection with any security, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contrav-
ention of any rules and regulations that the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) might
prescribe for the protection of the public interest and investors. Id.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). Rule lOb-5 prohibits any person, through the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, from using or employing any deceptive
or manipulative device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
47. Moore, 590 F.2d at 825. The arbitration agreement in Moore provided that the parties
would settle any future controversy between the parties by arbitration before the National
Association of Securities Dealers, or the New York Stock Exchange, or the American Stock
Exchange. Id. at 825 n.2. The arbitration agreement provided that the customer would have
the right to elect which arbitral tribunal would conduct the arbitration. Id.
48. Id. at 829.
49. Id. at 827; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing § 12(2) of '33 Act).
50. Moore, 590 F.2d at 827. The brokerage firm in Moore argued that Wilko is limited
to § 12(2) of the '33 Act and that Wilko is not applicable to arbitration agreements concerning
'34 Act claims. Id.
51. Id. The Moore court stated that the purpose of the rule lOb-5 remedy is to protect
"vulnerable" investors from "aggressive and sophisticated" sellers. Id.
19851
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Act, provides investors with a judicial remedy for claims arising under
section 10(b) of the '34 Act. 52 Finally, the Moore court noted that section
29(a)5 3 of the '34 Act, which is identical to section 14 of the '33 Act, voids
any stipulation that binds a person to waive compliance with any provision
of the '34 Act or any rule or regulation under the '34 act.5 4 The Moore court
held that the anti-waiver provision of the '34 Act, section 29(a), forbade a
waiver of the judicial remedy pursuant to rule 10b-5 through a predispute
arbitration agreement 5 The courts are virtually unanimous in applying the
Wilko doctrine to the '34 Act on the grounds enunciated in Moore.1
6
Wilko and the cases that apply Wilko to the '34 Act have interpreted
section 14 of the '33 Act and section 29(a) of the '34 Act to void predispute
arbitration agreements as a means of enforcing compliance with the judicial
remedy afforded by section 12(2) of the '33 Act and rule lOb-5 under the
'34 Act. 7 Underlying these statutory interpretations is the policy of protecting
"vulnerable" security investors from "aggressive and sophisticated" security
sellers.-" Whether the Wilko doctrine applies to claims arising under the CEA
depends upon the existence of an anti-waiver provision similar to section 14
of the '33 Act or section 29(a) of the '34 Act in the CEA and the policy
considerations underlying the enactment of the CEA.5 9
Unlike the '33 Act and '34 Act, the CEA specifically encourages arbitra-
tion of disputes arising under the CEA. 6° Sections 5a(l1) and 17(b)(10) state
52. Id.; see supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing rule l0b-5 remedy).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). Section 29(a) of the '34 Act provides that any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of the '34
Act or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange is void. Id.; see also
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing § 14 of '33 Act).
54. Moore, 590 F.2d at 827.
55. Id. The Tenth Circuit in Moore stated that through § 29(a) of the '34 Act, Congress
carried the investor protection policy of § 14 of the '33 Act into the '34 Act. Id.; see supra
notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing § 14 of '33 Act). The Moore court stated that
even though arbitration would be faster and less costly to the public, the policy of investor
protection underlying the anti-waiver provision should prevail. Moore, 590 F.2d at 827.
56. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing cases that hold Wilko doctrine
applicable to '34 Act claims). The courts have created several exceptions to the Wilko doctrine
which invalidates predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the federal securities
laws. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 447 U.S. 506, 519, 520 (1974) (agreement to arbitrate
dispute arising out of international commercial transaction enforceable even though claim arose
under '34 Act); Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637, 638 (1977)(Wilko doctrine does
not extend beyond cases involving unsophisticated investors to cases between stock exchange
members); cf. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1241 (1985) (Arbitration
Act requires district court to grant motion to compel arbitration of state claims pendant to
federal securities laws claims).
57. See supra notes 14-56 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko doctrine as applied
to '33 Act and '34 Act).
58. Moore, 590 F.2d at 827.
59. See infra notes 60-168 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of Wilko
doctrine to claims arising under CEA).
60. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 5a(l I) and 17(b)(10) of
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that contract markets and registered futures associations must provide a
"fair", "equitable" and "voluntary" procedure through arbitration or
otherwise for the settlement of customer claims against any member or
employee of a contract market or registered futures association. 6' To clarify
the general language of sections 5a(ll) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) promulgated regulations
sections 180.1 to 180.5.62 Regulation section 180.263 defines the minimum
requirements that a contract market or registered futures association must
provide for a fair and equitable procedure for the settlement of customer
claims under sections 5a(11) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA. 64 Regulation section
180.2 requires that customers have the choice of an arbitration panel or
other decision maker of which at least a majority are associated with a
contract market or any member or employee of a contract market, and that
each party has the right to be represented by counsel before the decision
maker. 65 Regulation section 180.2 also requires that the procedure for the
settlement of customer claims provide for the prompt settlement of claims,
that notice to the parties be adequate, that there be an opportunity for a
prompt hearing, and that the hearing not be so informal as to deny due
process. 66 Finally, regulation section 180.2 requires that each party be entitled
to examine other parties, witnesses and relevant documents, that a record of
the hearing be available upon request, that the arbitral tribunal render the
settlement award promptly and in writing, that the settlement award be final,
and that the procedure shall not impose any restrictions on the jurisdiction
or venue of any court to enforce an award so rendered. 67
CEA); supra text accompanying notes 57-58 (§ 14 of '33 Act and § 29(a) of '34 Act void
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under '33 and '34 Acts). The CEA does not
contain an anti-waiver provision similar to § 14 of the '33 Act or § 29(a) of the '34 Act. See 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
61. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(ll), 21(b)(10) (1982).
62. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-180.5 (1984) (CFTC regulations concerning arbitration and
other dispute resolution procedures); supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing background
of CFTC regulations); infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulations).
An arbitration agreement that fails to comply with the CFTC regulations is invalid and
unenforceable. See, e.g., Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174,
1179 (2d Cir. 1977) (arbitration agreements that do not conform to CFTC regulations are
invalid); Wanty v. Sprow, 1977-80 COMM. FUT. L. REp. (CCH) 20,548 AT 22,556 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (court cannot compel arbitration if arbitration agreement does not comply with CFTC
regulation § 180.3); Markowitz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 105 Misc. 2d
971, 972, 430 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (arbitration agreements that do not
conform to CFTC regulation § 180.3 are void).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (1984).
64. Id.; see supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 5a(l 1) and 17(b)(10) of
CEA).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (1984).
66. Id.
67. Id. CFTC regulation § 180.2 provides that there is no right of appeal to any entity
within the contract market that can overturn the settlement procedure decision and that the
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In addition to requiring contract markets and futures associations to
provide a procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement of
customer claims that is fair and equitable, sections 5a(11) and 17(b)(10) of
the CEA require that such procedure be voluntary. 61 While sections 5a(11)
and 17(b)(10) do not concern expressly the validity of a predispute arbitration
agreement between a customer and contract market member, 69 regulation
section 180.3 addresses the requirement that a predispute arbitration agree-
ment be voluntary. 70 Regulation section 180.3 requires that the predispute
arbitration agreement not be made a condition precedent to the customer's
use of the contract market member's offered services and that the customer
separately endorse the arbitration agreement. 7' Additionally, regulation sec-
tion 180.3 provides that the predispute arbitration agreement may not require
the customer to waive his right to seek reparations under section 1472 of the
CEA and that the agreement inform the customer of his right to select the
arbitration forum. 73 Finally, regulation section 180.3 requires that the pre-
dispute arbitration agreement include, in large boldface type, the cautionary
only right of appeal is that which exists under applicable law. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2(f) (1984). The
law applicable to a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the CEA is the
Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing
Arbitration Act). Under the Arbitration Act, the grounds upon which a court will vacate,
modify or correct an arbitration award, or direct a rehearing by the arbitrators, are very limited.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1982) (setting forth grounds upon which a court will vacate, modify or
correct an arbitration award, or direct a rehearing by the arbitrators).
68. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(ll), 21(b)(10) (1982); see supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text
(discussing §§ 5a(1 1) and 17(b)(10) of CEA).
69. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(ll), 21(b)(10) (1982). Sections 5a(ll) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA
require contract markets and registered futures associations to provide a fair, equitable and
voluntary procedure through arbitration or otherwise to settle customers' claims but sections
5a(1 1) and 17(b)(10) neither sanction nor prohibit the use of predispute arbitration agreements).
See id.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1984). The CFTC enacted regulation § 180.3 in response to the
widespread practice by commodities brokerage firms of compelling customers to sign predispute
arbitration clauses as a precondition to doing business with the firm. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,526
(1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 42,945 (1976). The CFTC found compulsory predispute arbitration
agreements to be so prevalent that a customer could be frozen out of the futures market if he
refused to sign a predispute arbitration agreement. Id. The CFTC issued regulation § 180.3 to
insure that the customer's agreement to arbitrate was truly voluntary. 42 Fed. Reg. 27,526-28
(1976).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1984); see Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 567
F.2d 1174, 1179-81 (2d Cir. 1977) (court held compulsory predispute arbitration agreement
unenforceable under CFTC regulation § 180.3).
72. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Section 14 of the CEA provides that any person complaining
of any violation of the CEA or any rule, regulation or order thereunder by another person
required to be registered under the CEA, may file a complaint for damages with the CFTC
within two years after the claim arises. Id. The CFTC may award damages to the complainant
if it finds that a violation of the CEA resulting in monetary injury to the complainant has
occurred. Id.; see 1 P. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at § 1.84 (discussing CEA reparations
proceedings).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1984).
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language spelled out in regulation section 180.3 (b)(6)74 which informs the
customer of the consequences of signing an arbitration agreement and notifies
the customer that he need not sign the arbitration agreement. 75 Courts have
held that predispute arbitration agreements which fail to meet the require-
ments of the CFTC regulations are invalid. 76 The question remains whether
a predispute arbitration agreement that complies with the CFTC regulations
is nonetheless invalid under the Wilko doctrine which invalidates predispute
agreements to arbitrate federal securities law claims.
77
The majority of the courts that have addressed the issue of whether a
predispute arbitration agreement that complies with the CFTC regulations is
valid in light of the Wilko doctrine have enforced the agreement.78 For
74. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(6) (1984).
75. Id. CFTC regulation § 180.3(b) (6) requires every predispute arbitration agreement to
include the following language printed in large boldface type:
THREE FORMS EXIST FOR THE RESOLUTION OF COMMODITIES DIS-
PUTES: CIVIL COURT LITIGATION, REPARATIONS AT THE COMMODITIES
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC) AND ARBITRATION CON-
DUCTED BY A SELF-REGULATORY OR OTHER PRIVATE ORGANIZATION.
THE CFTC RECOGNIZES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE DIS-
PUTES BY ARBITRATION MAY IN SOME CASES PROVIDE MANY BENEFITS
TO CUSTOMERS, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN AN EXPEDITIOUS
AND FINAL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES WITHOUT INCURRING SUBSTAN-
TIAL COSTS. THE CFTC REQUIRES, HOWEVER, THAT EACH CUSTOMER
INDIVIDUALLY EXAMINE THE RELATIVE MERITS OF ARBITRATION AND
THAT YOUR CONSENT TO THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BE VOLUN-
TARY.
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT YOU: (I) MAY BE WAIVING YOUR
RIGHT TO SUE IN A COURT OF LAW: AND (2) ARE AGREEING TO BE
BOUND BY ARBITRATION OF ANY CLAIMS OR COUNTERCLAIMS WHICH
YOU OR [NAME] MAY SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREE-
MENT. YOU ARE NOT, HOWEVER, WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO ELECT
INSTEAD TO PETITION THE CFTC TO INSTITUTE REPARATIONS PRO-
CEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 14 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
WITH RESPECT TO ANY DISPUTE WHICH MAY BE ARBITRATED PUR-
SUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT. IN THE EVENT A DISPUTE ARISES, YOU
WILL BE NOTIFIED IF [NAME] INTENDS TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO
ARBITRATION. IF YOU BELIEVE A VIOLATION OF THE COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT IS INVOLVED AND IF YOU PREFER TO REQUEST A
SECTION 14 "REPARATIONS" PROCEEDING BEFORE THE CFTC, YOU
WILL HAVE 45 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SUCH NOTICE IN WHICH TO
MAKE THAT ELECTION.
YOU NEED NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT
WITH [NAME]. SEE 17 C.F.R. 180.1-180.5.
Id.
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussion of cases holding invalid predis-
pute arbitration agreements that fail to comply with CFTC regulations).
77. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulations concerning
arbitration); supra notes 14-58 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko doctrine).
78. See Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
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example, in Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,79 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a predispute arbitration
agreement that complied with the CFTC regulations was valid and enforce-
able. 80 The plaintiff customer in Ingbar signed an arbitration agreement when
he opened an account with the defendant commodities brokerage firm.," The
customer in Ingbar later brought an action against the firm under the CEA
for the loss of money invested with the firm.8 2 The brokerage firm moved
initially for a stay of the trial pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration Act. "
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the
defendant's motion with respect to the plaintiff's CEA claims.
84
On appeal to the First Circuit, the customer in Ingbar argued that the
CEA implicity forbids all predispute arbitration agreements between com-
modities brokers and their customers under the Wilko doctrine, and alter-
natively, that the arbitration agreement failed to satisfy the CFTC regulations."
Despite the customer's argument, the Ingbar court refused to extend the
Wilko doctrine to claims arising under the CEA. 86 The First Circuit stated
Inc., 720 F.2d 1446, 1449 (5th Cir. 1983). (arbitration of CEA claims is permissible as Wilko
doctrine does not extend to CEA cases); Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 683 F.2d
603, 605-06 (Ist Cir. 1982) (predispute arbitration agreement that complies with CFTC regula-
tions is valid); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding predispute agreements to arbitrate CEA claims valid); Tamari v. Bache &
Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1977) (CEA does not prohibit predispute
arbitration agreements), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Corcoran v. Shearson American
Express, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (nothing in CEA or legislative history
reveals congressional intent that predispute agreements to arbitrate CEA claims should not be
enforceable); Hagstron v. Breutman, 572 F. Supp. 692, 700-01 (N.D. Il1. 1983) (no basis for
extending Wilko doctrine to claims arising under CEA); Romnes v. Bache & Co., Inc., 439 F.
Supp. 833, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (predispute agreements to arbitrate CEA claims are valid).
79. 683 F.2d 603 (Ist Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 605-08; see infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (discussing Jngbar).
81. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 604. The arbitration agreement in Ingbar provided that the
customer and brokerage firm would submit any future controversy between them to arbitration
before the American Arbitration Association or the Board of Arbitration of the New York
Stock Exchange. Id.
82. Id. The plaintiff in Ingbar alleged that the defendant brokerage firm was legally liable
for $24,000 that the plaintiff lost through investments with the firm. Id.
83. Id.; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing § 3 of Arbitration Act).
84. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 604.
85. Id. at 606-08. The customer in Ingbar claimed that the arbitration agreement violated
CFTC regulation § 180.3 (b)(1) which states that signing an arbitration agreement may not be
made a precondition for the customer's utilization of the services offered by the commodities
merchant. Id. at 607; see 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(1) (1984). The customer claimed that the
arbitration agreement violated CFTC regulation § 180.3(b)(1) because the brokerage firm told
the customer that the customer had to sign the "contract" to open an account with the firm
and the customer understood the term "contract" to include the account agreement and the
arbitration agreement. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 607; see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text
(discussing CFTC regulation § 180.3); infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing Ingbar
court's holding on customer's claim that arbitration agreement violated CFTC regulation §
180.3).
86. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 605-06.
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that Wilko turned on the language of specific provisions of the '33 act that
have no similar counterparts in the CEA.8 7 The Ingbar court noted that the
CEA has no provision similar to section 22(a) of the '33 Act that grants
plaintiffs the right to select the judicial forum,88 nor section 14 of the '33
Act which forbids a waiver of any of the rights granted under the '33 Act.8 9
The First Circuit also stated that section 5a(1 1) of the CEA compels contract
markets to provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or
otherwise to settle customer claims against contract market members. 9°
Finally, the Ingbar court noted that the CFTC promulgated regulations
which specifically sanction the use of predispute arbitration agreements. 9'
The First Circuit in Ingbar concluded, therefore, that the statutory language
basis of the Wilko decision had no applicability to the CEA.92
In addition to ruling that the statutory basis of the Wilko decision did
not apply to the CEA, the Ingbar court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the policy considerations underlying the Wilko decision applied to the
CEA. 9 The First Circuit stated that the strict requirements imposed by the
CFTC regulations on predispute arbitration agreements assure that commod-
ity customers enter predispute arbitration agreements voluntarily and that
the agreements are fair.94 The Ingbar court ruled that the CFTC regulations
satisfy the practical concerns of unequal bargaining power and broker
aggressiveness that Wilko addressed. 9 The First Circuit in Ingbar found that
the arbitration agreement between the customer and brokerage firm met the
requirements of the CFTC regulations and, therefore, held the agreement
valid and enforceable.
9 6
87. Id. at 605.
88. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) (granting jurisdiction of offenses and suits under
'33 Act to United States district courts and state courts); supra text accompanying notes 31-32
(discussing § 22(a) of '33 Act).
89. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 605; see 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (voiding stipulations binding
persons acquiring securities to waive compliance with provisions of '33 Act); supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text (discussing § 14 of '33 Act).
90. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 605; see 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l 1) (1982) (contract markets must provide
fair, equitable and voluntary procedure through arbitration or otherwise for settlement of
customers' claims); supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (discussing § 5a(l 1) of CEA).
91. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 605; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-180.5 (1984) (CFTC regulations
concerning arbitration and other dispute settlement procedures); supra text accompanying notes
62-76 (discussing CFTC regulations).
92. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 605.
93. Id.; see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing policy basis of Wilko
doctrine).
94. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 604; see supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing
CFTC regulations concerning arbitration agreements).
95. Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 605-06.
96. Id. at 606-08. The Ingbar court rejected the customer's claim that the arbitration
agreement violated CFTC regulation § 180.3(b)(1). Id. at 607; see supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text (discussing customer's claim in Ingbar that arbitration agreement violated CFTC
regulation § 180.3(b)(1). The Ingbar court ruled that given the customer's advanced education,
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The few courts that have extended the Wilko doctrine, which invalidates
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the federal securities
laws, to CEA claims have done so on policy grounds. 97 In Milani v.
ContiCommodity Services, Inc.,98 the plaintiff, a former customer of the
defendant commodities brokerage firm, brought an action against the defend-
ant alleging violations of sections 4b and 4o of the CEA.99 The defendant in
Milani filed a motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiff's claims in
accordance with the arbitration clause 'contained in the customer's agreement
that the plaintiff had signed.10E The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California denied the defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.' 0' The Milani court cited Wilko in stating that judicial direction
is essential to assure the proper application of legislation designed to protect
investors and the integrity of the marketplace. 0 2 The district court in Milani
concluded that because the CEA, like the '33 and '34 Acts, is designed to
protect the investing public, the Wilko doctrine applies to invalidate predis-
pute agreements to arbitrate CEA claims. 03
In Breyer v. First Nat. Monetary Corp.,"°4 the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey also extended the Wilko doctrine to
invalidate a predispute agreement to arbitrate CEA claims. 05 The plaintiff
in Breyer, a customer, entered a commodities trading agreement with the
defendant, a commodities trading advisor. 0 6 The plaintiff signed a customer
the bold type of the arbitration agreement, the plain language of the arbitration agreement, the
separate signature of the arbitration agreement, and the totality of the circumstances, the
arbitration agreement did not violate CFTC regulation § 180.3(b)(1). Ingbar, 683 F.2d at 607.
97. See Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,217
at 29,148-49 (9th Cir. 1984) (predispute arbitration agreement invalid as to customer's CEA
claim that required statutory interpretation of CEA); Breyer v. First Nat. Monetary Corp., 548
F. Supp. 955, 961 (D.N.J. 1982) (arbitration generally is unsuitable for CEA claims except
under narrow circumstances delineated in § 5a(ll) of CEA); Milani v. ContiCommodity Serv.,
Inc., 462 F. Supp. 405, 407 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (CEA policy of protecting investors outweighs
Arbitration Act policy of promoting arbitration); infra notes 98-132 and accompanying text
(discussing Marchese, Breyer and Milani).
98. 462 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal 1976).
99. Id. at 406. Section 4b of the CEA regulates commodity contracts designed to defraud
or mislead, bucketing orders, and buying and selling orders for commodities. 7 U.S.C. § 6b
(1982). Section 40 of the CEA regulates fraud and misrepresentation by commodities trading
advisors and commodity pool operators. 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1982).
100. Milani, 462 F. Supp. at 406. The arbitration agreement in Milani provided that any
controversy between the parties would be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of
the American Arbitration Association or the arbitration committee of any exchange. Id.
101. Id. at 407.
102. Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37).
103. Milani, 462 F. Supp. at 407; see supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (analysis
of Milani).
104. 548 F. Supp. 955 (D.N.J. 1982).
105. Id. at 961; see infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text (discussing Breyer).
106. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 956. A commodities trading advisor is a person who, for
compensation or profit, is in the business of advising others as to the value of or the advisability
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account agreement that contained a clause requiring the arbitration of any
dispute arising from the commodities trading agreement at the election of
either party.0 7 When the plaintiff's account suffered substantial losses as a
result of a fall in the price of silver, the defendant issued a call to the
plaintiff for additional collateral to raise the account to the required main-
tenance level.103 As authorized by the customer account agreement the
defendant liquidated the plaintiff's account after the plaintiff failed to
provide the additional collateral.109 The defendant then instituted arbitration
proceedings against the plaintiff to recover the 61,000 dollar deficit in the
plaintiff's account."10 The plaintiff responded by filing an action in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging violations
of various provisions of the '33 Act, the '34 Act, SEC rule lOb-5, and the
CEA."'
The district court in Breyer addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff's
CEA claims should have been resolved by arbitration pursuant to the
predispute arbitration clause in the customer account agreement.11 2 The
Breyer court first noted that federal policy favors arbitration of disputes and
that section 2 of the Arbitration Act implements that policy.'"3 The district
court in Breyer also noted that the courts have established an exception to
the Arbitration Act in cases such as Wilko that involved federal legislation
designed to protect a large segment of the public, often in an inferior
bargaining position."' 4 The Breyer court stated that the rationale supporting
an exception to the Arbitration Act in cases involving protective federal
legislation is the principle that the arbitral forum is inadequate to effectuate
of trading in any futures contract made or to be made on or subject to the rules of a contract
market. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
107. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 955. The arbitration clause in Breyer provided for arbitration
in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Id. at n.3.
108. Id. at 955.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I 11. Id. The plaintiff in Breyer alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff
to trade in commodities by misrepresenting the level of risk involved. Id. The plaintiff in Breyer
further alleged that the defendant manipulated the plaintiff's commodities account to the benefit
of the defendant. Id.
112. Id. at 958-61.
113. Id. at 959; see supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing § 2 of Arbitration Act).
114. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 959. The Breyer court cited several other areas of protective
federal legislation in addition to the federal securities laws, in which courts have held arbitration
agreements unenforceable. Id.; see, e.g., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978) (claims under antitrust laws are inappropriate
for enforcement by arbitration); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-37 (2d Cir.) (Bankruptcy
Act claims are not arbitrable), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v.
Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970) (patent validity issues are
inappropriate for'arbitration proceedings), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); cf. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (Court held that Title VII claimant did not waive his
statutory right to trial by claimant's prior submission of claim to arbitration).
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the protective policies underlying the protective federal legislation." 5 The
district court in Breyer then examined whether claims arising under the CEA
fell within the protective federal legislation exception to the Arbitration
Act."
16
The Breyer court stated that although Congress expressly sanctioned the
arbitration of CEA claims through the 1974 enactment of section 5a(11) of
the CEA, Congress narrowly limited the arbitration procedure to CEA claims
of less than 15,000 dollars." 7 The district court in Breyer stated that the
15,000 dollar limit implies that Congress did not consider arbitration of CEA
claims in excess of 15,000 dollars to be permissible." 8 Since the defendant's
claim in Breyer of 60,000 dollars greatly exceeded the 15,000 dollar limit
Congress imposed on arbitrable CEA claims, the Breyer court held the
arbitration agreement unenforceable on the basis of the protective federal
legislation exception to the Arbitration Act.1"9 In effect, the Breyer court
held that the Wilko doctrine applies to CEA claims in excess of the 15,000
dollar limit Congress established in section 5a(l 1) of the CEA.'
20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the
Wilko doctrine to invalidate a predispute agreement to arbitrate CEA claims
on a much more limited basis than in Milani or Breyer, in Marchese v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.'21 In Marchese, the plaintiff customer engaged
in commodities futures trading through the defendant, a securities broker
115. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 959. The Breyer court stated that the protective federal
legislation exception applies when a collision occurs between the competing policies of federal
statutory protection of a large segment of the public, often in an inferior bargaining position,
and promotion of arbitration as a speedy and economical solution of disputes. Id.
116. Id. at 960-61.
117. Id.; see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing § 5a(I 1) of CEA). Prior
to the enactment of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, the required arbitration procedure of §§
5a(ll) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA did not apply to claims in excess of $15,000. See 7 U.S.C. §§
7a(ll) (ii), 21(b)(10)(ii) (1980) (limiting required arbitration procedure to customer claims of
less than $15,000); supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing § 217 of Futures Trading
Act of 1982 which eliminated $15,000 ceiling on arbitrable claims). The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey decided Breyer prior to the enactment of the Futures
Trading Act. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. 955.
118. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 960.
119. Id. at 961. The Breyer court ruled that when a party seeks arbitration of claims
outside the narrow limitations of section 5a(11) of the CEA, the protective federal legislation
exception applies to deny enforcement of the arbitration agreement. Id.
120. Breyer, 545 F.2d at 960-61; see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (analysis of
Breyer in light of § 217 of Futures Trading Act of 1982 which eliminated $15,000 ceiling on
arbitrable claims).
121. Comm. Fyr. L. REP. (CCH) 22,217 at 29,144 (9th Cir. 1984).
122. Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,217, at 29,144. A commodities futures commission
merchant is any individual, association, partnership, corporation or trust engaged in soliciting
or accepting orders to buy or sell futures contracts on or subject to the rules of any contract
market and who, in connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any
money, securities or property, or extends credit to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or
contracts that might result from the solicitation or acceptance of orders to buy or sell futures
contracts. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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and commodities futures commission merchant. 12 2 A "Commodity Customer
Agreement" that contained an arbitration clause governed the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant.' 23 The plaintiff filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a
declaratory judgment that section 4d 124 of the CEA and its attendant regu-
lations provide that the plaintiff is entitled to the "interest and increment"
on the plaintiff's margin deposits except to the extent of the defendant's
lawful brokerage commission.23 The district court ordered the plaintiff to
submit his claim to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.
26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court and held the arbitration agreement unenforceable with respect
to the plaintiff's CEA claim. 27 The Marchese court stated that the customer's
claim involved the interpretation for the first time in the Ninth Circuit of
section 4d of the CEA.' 28 The Marchese court ruled that statutory interpre-
tation is a duty of the courts, not arbitrators. 29 The Ninth Circuit stated
that protective legislation, such as the CEA, especially requires judicial
interpretation because arbitrators might include the commodities industry
insiders who would deny the customer of the objectivity intended by the
protective legislation. '0 The Marchese court, however, did not rule out the
possibility of future arbitration of similar CEA claims.' The Ninth Circuit
stated that judicial construction of section 4d of the CEA now would
eliminate the need for further judicial consideration of the issue and provide
guidance to future arbitrators of section 4d by clarifying the law.'3
2
The Milani, Breyer, and Marchese decisions are reconcilable with the
proposition that the Wilko doctrine, which invalidates predispute agreements
123. Marchese, CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 22,217, at 29,145. The arbitration agreement
in Marchese provided that any controversy arising between the parties would be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the American Arbitration Association
of the Board of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Id. at n.2.
124. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1982). Section 4d of the CEA regulates futures commission merchants
and the care and use of monies and securities of customers received by futures commission
merchants. Id.
125. Marchese, COMM. FuT. L. REp. 22,217, at 29,147.
126. Id. The district court in Marchese held that the arbitration agreement complied with
the CFTC regulations and that the customer's claim fell within the scope -of the arbitration
agreement. Id.; see supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulations
concerning arbitration).
127. Marchese, CoMm. FUT. L. REP. 22,217, at 29,148; see infra notes 128-32 and
accompanying text (discussing rationale of Ninth Circuit in Marchese).
128. Marchese, COMM. FUT. L. REP. 22,217, at 29,149; see supra notes 124-25 and
accompanying text (discussing § 4d of CEA).
129. Id. (citing Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1984)).
130. Marchese, CoMm. FUT. L. REP. 22,217, at 29,148 (citing Tamari v. Bache & Co.
(Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194, 1205-06 (7th Cir. 1977) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 905 (1978)).
131. CoMm. Fui. L. REP. 22,217, at 29,149.
132. Id.; see infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text (analysis of Marchese).
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to arbitrate claims arising under the securities laws, does not extend to claims
arising under the CEA. 33 The Wilko doctrine is an exception to the Arbitra-
tion Act.'3 4 The Wilko doctrine is the result of a congressional determination,
expressed in the anti-waiver provisions of the '33 Act and '34 Act, that a
stipulation which waives an investor's special right to a judicial forum is
void. 35 Additionally, the Wilko doctrine is grounded in the underlying policy
of the federal securities laws to protect unsophisticated investors from
sophisticated sellers. 3 6 The Wilko doctrine prevents sellers from maneuvering
buyers into a position that would weaken the investor's ability to recover
under the federal securities laws. 37 The statutory and policy bases that
comprise the Wilko doctrine justify the numerous court decisions which hold
that predispute agreements to arbitrate federal securities law claims are an
exception to the Arbitration Act's mandate that agreements to arbitrate shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.
3
1
Unlike the federal securities laws, the CEA contains neither the statutory
provisions nor the underlying policy considerations to sustain an exception
to the Arbitration Act similar to the Wilko doctrine. 3 9 In contrast to the
anti-waiver provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts, which void any stipulation
that waives an investor's right to select a judicial forum, sections 5a(l 1) and
17(b)(10) of the CEA encourage the use of arbitration to resolve CEA
133. See supra notes 14-58 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko doctrine); supra notes
98-132 and accompanying text (discussing Milani, Breyer, and Marchese decisions); infra notes
133-68 and accompanying text (analysis of whether Wilko doctrine extends to claims arising
under CEA).
134. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (arbitration agreement in contract involving interstate
commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable except when grounds exist at law or in
equity for revocation of any contract). The Arbitration Act embodies a strong federal policy to
encourage arbitration and to relieve congestion in the federal courts. See Prima Paint v. Flood
& Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (purpose of Arbitration Act is to provide arbitration
procedure, when selected by parties to contract, that is speedy and not subject to delay and
obstruction); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83
(D.C. Circ.) (Congress enacted Arbitration Act to establish alternative to complications of
litigation), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text
(discussing Arbitration Act).
135. See supra notes 14-58 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko doctrine); supra notes
32-34, 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing anti-waiver provisions of '33 Act and '34 Act);
supra notes 18, 23, 46, 52 (discussing investor's right to judicial forum under '33 Act and '34
Act).
136. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432, 435.
137. Id.
138. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (arbitration agreement in contract involving interstate
commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable except when grounds exist at law or in
equity for revocation of any contract). The anti-waiver provisions of the '33 Act, § 14, and the
'34 Act, § 29(a), provide grounds at law for the revocation of the arbitration agreement. See
id.; supra notes 32-34, 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing anti-waiver provision of '33
Act and '34 Act); supra note 42 and accompanying text (cases applying Wilko doctrine to '33
Act and '34 Act). '
139. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing CEA and arbitration).
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disputes. 40 Congress enacted sections 5a(ll) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA to
promote the use of arbitration as an out-of-court forum for the resolution
of CEA disputes.' 4' Furthermore, the CFTC enacted regulations sections
180.1 through 180.5 to ensure that the arbitration procedure is fair, equitable,
and voluntary. 42 An arbitration agreement or procedure that does not satisfy
the CFTC requirements is invalid.' 4' The CFTC regulations, therefore, meet
the policy concern of the Wilko doctrine that sophisticated sellers will take
advantage of unsophisticated buyers, by ensuring that commodity market
members may not compel a commodity investor to submit his CEA claim to
an unfair or inequitable arbitration proceeding. 44 Absent grounds for an
exception, the Arbitration Act requires a court to enforce a predispute
agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the CEA.
45
In light of the CFTC's promulgation of regulations sections 180.2 and
180.3, which ensure that the arbitration of CEA claims is fair, equitable,
and voluntary, and the enactment of section 217 of the Futures Trading Act
of 1982146 which eliminated the 15,000 dollar ceiling on arbitrable CEA
claims, the grounds supporting the decisions in Milani and Breyer to extend
the Wilko doctrine to claims arising under the CEA are no longer valid.
47
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
decided Milani before CFTC regulation section 180.3 became effective and
less than one month after CFTC regulation section 180.2 became effective 4. 1
The district court in Milani did not mention the CFTC regulations in the
140. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(l1), 21(b)(10) (1982) (contract markets and registered futures
associations must provide fair, equitable and voluntary procedure through arbitration or
otherwise for settlement of customer's claims).
141. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of §§ 5a(l 1)
and 17(b)(10) of CEA).
142. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-180.5 (1984) (CFTC regulations concerning arbitration and
other dispute settlement procedures); supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC
arbitration regulations).
143. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that arbitration
agreements which fail to conform to CFTC regulations are invalid).
144. See id.
145. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (arbitration agreement in contract involving interstate
commerce is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except when grounds exist at law or in equity
for revocation of any contract).
146. Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 217, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(ll),
21(b)(10) (1982); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of § 217
of Futures Trading Act of 1982).
147. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulations concerning
arbitration); supra notes 98-120 and accompanying text (discussing Milani and Breyer decisions);
infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text (analysis of Milani and Breyer decisions).
148. Milani, 462 F. Supp. 405 (1976). The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California decided Milani on October 26, 1976. Id. CFTC regulation § 180.3 did not
become effective until November 29, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 42,942-47 (1976). CFTC regulation §
180.2 became effective on September 30, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,523 (1976).
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court's opinion. 49 The Milani court relied upon the grounds of investor
protection enunciated in Wilko to invalidate the predispute arbitration agree-
ment.5 0 The CFTC regulations promulgated just prior to and after the Milani
decision satisfy the policy concerns of investor protection present in Wilko
and echoed in Milani.'51 The district court in Milani, therefore, might not
have invalidated the predispute arbitration agreement had it considered the
agreements in light of the CFTC regulations.'
52
The Breyer decision, like Milani, is also reconcilable with the Wilko
doctrine as a decision of poor timing. 153 The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey decided Breyer prior to Congress' enactment of
the Futures Trading Act of 1982.' 54 Section 217 of the Futures Trading Act
amended sections 5a(11) and 17(b)(10) of the CEA to eliminate the 15,000
dollar ceiling on arbitrable CEA claims. 55 Congress eliminated the 15,000
dollar ceiling to encourage further the use of arbitration as a means of
settling customer disputes arising under the CEA. 5 6 In Breyer, the district
court held the predispute arbitration agreement unenforceable because the
CEA claim involved exceeded the old 15,000 dollar limit on arbitrable CEA
claims. 5 7 The Breyer court probably would not reach the same result today
in light of the subsequent passage of section 217 of the Futures Trading Act
of 1982.1s
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Marchese is also reconcilable with the
149. Milani, 462 F. Supp. at 405-07.
150. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (discussing Milani).
151. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulations); supra
notes 78-96 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that predispute agreements to
arbitrate CEA claims that comply with CFTC regulations are valid nowithstanding Wilko).
152. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (reconciling Milani with proposition
that Wilko doctrine does not extend to claims arising under CEA).
153. See supra notes 104-20 and accompanying text (discussing Breyer); infra notes 154-58
and accompanying text (analysis of Breyer).
154. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 955. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided Breyer on September 9, 1982. Id. The Futures Trading Act of 1982 became effective
on January 11, 1983. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 239, 96 Stat. 2294
(1983).
155. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 217, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 5a(l 1), 17(b) (10) (1982)); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing §
219 of Futures Trading Act of 1982).
156. See H. R. REP. No. 565, Part 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1982) (purpose of
amendments to §§ 5a(1 1) and 17(b)(10) of CEA was to enhance attractiveness of arbitration as
out-of-court forum for resolution of customer-contract market member disputes), reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3871, 3905.
157. Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 961.
158. See Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 961. The Breyer court relied on the implication that
Congress did not approve of the arbitration of CEA claims in excess of the old $15,000 ceiling
on arbitrable claims to deny arbitration of the $60,000 CEA claim in Breyer. Id. Since Congress
expressly approved the arbitration of CEA claims in excess of $15,000 by enacting § 217 of the
Futures Trading Act of 1982, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
probably would not decide Breyer the same way today.
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proposition that the Wilko doctrine does not extend to claims arising under
the CEA.'5 9 The Marchese court did not hold that predispute agreements to
arbitrate CEA claims are invalid on the statutory and policy grounds of the
Wilko doctrine.' 6 The Marchese decision is limited to CEA claims that
involve statutory interpretations of first impression of CEA provisions.' 6t
The customer's claim in Marchese involved the interpretation of section 4d
of the CEA for the first time in the Ninth Circuit. 62 The Ninth Circuit stated
that a judicial interpretation of section 4d of the CEA would eliminate the
need for further judicial consideration of section 4d and assist future
arbitrators by clarifying the meaning of section 4d. 63 The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Marchese, therefore, implicitly supports the arbitration of CEA
claims in cases that do not involve statutory interpretations of first impression
of CEA provisions. 64
With the limited exception of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marchese,
there exists no statutory nor policy grounds for a court to extend the Wilko
doctrine to invalidate a predispute agreement to arbitrate CEA claims that
complies with the CFTC regulations. 65 Congress enacted sections 5a(l I) and
17(b)(10) of the CEA to promote the use of arbitration as an out-of-court
forum for the resolution of CEA disputes. '" The CFTC promulgated CFTC
regulations sections 180.1 through 180.5 to meet the policy concerns of the
Wilko doctrine by ensuring that predispute agreements to arbitrate CEA
claims are fair, equitable, and voluntary.' 67 In the absence of statutory or
policy grounds for an exception, the Arbitration Act requires a court to
enforce a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the CEA. 16S
DANA JAMES BOLTON
159. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text (discussing Marchese); infra notes 160-
64 and accompanying text (analysis of Marchese).
160. Marchese, CoM.w FUT. L. REP. 22,217, at 29,149. The Ninth Circuit in Marchese
stated that its holding was consistent with the policies favoring arbitration. Id.
161. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 162-64 (explaining limitation of Marchese
holding).
162. Marchese, ComiM. Fur. L. REP. 22,217 at 29,149.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text (reconciling Marchese with proposition
that Wilko doctrine does not extend to claims arising under CEA); infra notes 166-68 (discussing
Wilko doctrine's inapplicability to predispute agreements to arbitrate CEA claims that comply
with CFTC regulations).
166. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of §§ 5a(1 I)
and 17(b)(I0) of CEA).
167. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing CFTC regulations §§ 180.1-
180.5).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13 (discussing § 2 of Arbitration Act).
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